Thinking about the Role of Leading Powers and, Yes, Emerging and Middle Powers as Well

Just in time for the weekend a piece that continues recent thinking about the collective possibilities with emerging and middle powers.

On the global order front much has been happening in the last week;  and then, again, not so much has been happening. Let me explain. 

On the happening side it is all about geopolitics and more directly geopolitics in the Middle East - most pointedly the shadow war between Israel and Iran - which heated up and indeed came out of the shadows in just the last week. As just about all know, the Iranians launched a barrage of some 300 drones and missiles against Israel all, or nearly all seemingly destroyed by Israel and friends. Of course this barrage came after an April 1st Israeli assassination of seven senior Revolutionary Guards commanders bombed by Israeli jets in Syria. Nevertheless, the  barrage was startling. As Suzanne Maloney who is Vice President of Brookings and Director of its Foreign Policy program put it in a just published FA piece:  

Especially after the October 7 Hamas massacres, Iran’s unprecedented strike on Israeli territory has transformed the confrontation from one taking place mainly in the shadows to an imminent existential peril.

Now, as we now know - and what was unknown at the time of Maloney’s writing, the Israeli response has been limited apparently and intended, presumably, to halt at least for the present the direct tit-for-tat between Iran and Israel. So that appears to be where we lie in the ever volatile Middle East.  

What remains relevant to this Israeli-Iranian confrontation, however, even if the direct exchanges between Israel and Iran are eliminated for the moment are the actions required, it is urged, on the Biden Administration. Notwithstanding, US efforts to try and avoid direct US action, Maloney was quite clear that such US action would be necessary: 

A wider conflict would have a cascade of devastating implications for the region and the world. It would exacerbate violence and displacement across the region, torpedo progress toward Arab-Israeli normalization, generate significant economic disruptions with far-reaching effects. Staving off such a disaster will require that Washington use its unmatched diplomatic and military resources in ways that it has hesitated to deploy so far. It must both push for a pause to the fighting in Gaza—which would deprive Iran of reasons to keep attacking Israel—and seriously threaten Tehran to deter it from further retaliation. Washington may not be happy about taking these measures, but it has no choice. Only the Biden administration, beleaguered as it may be, can head off a catastrophic escalation.

Now Dan Drezner, ‘Drezner’s World’ in today’s Substack - “Is Israel Moving Down the Learning Curve?” reviews the situation and commentary and underscores the need for US action in the region: 

Maloney is correct — this is a heavy lift and yet the U.S. is really the only actor capable of doing it. Will the Biden administration be up to the task? 

Let me leave aside the important discussion of Biden action in these circumstances - actually Drezner and Maloney do a credible examination and should be examined closely - it does seem to me that US diplomacy and more will be necessary to ‘quiet’ the Middle East  and prevent a much more devastating confrontation between Israel and Iran.  I raise this because the circumstances focus on US influence and its presumed leading role. 

What seems apparent is that not only do analysts and policy types presume a US leading role in the dramatic geopolitical events of the order but also leading ‘all’ global order initiatives. And in this broader context this includes critical global governance actions whether it is climate change policy or global financial reform or global trade policy or whatever. While such a presumption is, I suspect, not surprising I do think it requires more reflection and analysis. This came to mind when I reviewed - prior to the incendiary actions of Israel and Iran - an interesting piece by Chivvis and Geaghan-Breiner released by CEIP titled: “Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft”. The authors focus on ten emerging powers: Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. Now identifying the critical Middle Powers is always difficult though I would have liked to see the authors examine South Korea, and possibly Japan. In fact the authors do mention Korea. As they reveal:  

These countries thus are representative of but not constitutive of the Global South. They are among the world’s “middle powers” but do not represent that grouping, which also includes countries such as Germany and South Korea. “Middle powers” is a static term and does not convey the dynamism that these emerging powers will bring to the future world political order. Although these are “rising powers,” they are not constitutive of that category, which would also include China. “Hedgers” and “swing states” are sometimes used to describe this group, but as analytic terms these preconfigure conclusions in ways that we wish to avoid.

The heart of the piece, aside from all this discussion of who is an emerging power and their reactions to current US policy, however, is to focus on how the United States can help lead these emerging powers to greater collaboration. As the authors urge: 

It is crucial that the United States put forward an affirmative case for cooperation with these countries based on mutual benefit, rather than a negative case based on the need to counter China’s influence. This means that the United States needs to offer a clear value proposition, such as the benefits of working with innovative American entrepreneurs or social and economic gains from highly reliable U.S. technology. Areas of beneficial cooperation will vary by country, but they are likely to include adapting to climate change, combating deforestation and pollution, joining the energy transition, building public health infrastructure, boosting technology manufacturing, preparing for pandemics, diversifying supply chains, developing digital infrastructure, financing infrastructure, and tailoring market access and investment agreements. … The sensible and realistic strategy proposed here would require the United States to exercise restraint and adopt a long-term perspective of its relationships with emerging powers. With a consistent effort, the strategy would pay real dividends by increasing the chances of a stable and predictable international system in which these emerging powers play an important role.

Maybe it is unrealistic to focus on these, and indeed some other key emerging powers, as I mentioned Korea, and Germany, even the EU and Japan without examining how the US can ‘lead these horses to water’ but it might be a valuable exercise.  While many suggest that global order and global governance efforts - whether global economic or security - cannot be advanced without the leading powers, the US, and yes I’d suggest China, there are hints that emerging powers of various combinations - plurilateral or minilateral groupings - can in fact advance global policy, as strange as that might seem to many. One can imagine groups of emerging powers taking the lead in advancing critical global governance initiatives. I think I can.  While I won’t go further right now, I will return to emerging middle power diplomacy and action in the very near future.