The Taiwan Conundrum: ‘Deterring but not Provoking’ China* - National Rejuvenation vs ‘One China’

*This phrase is often expressed by my colleague Jessica Chen Weiss from Cornell University.

The arrival of Secretary Yellen in Beijing for talks with senior Chinese officials - this following Secretary’s Blinken’s trip to Beijing - seemed to suggest a modest ‘toning down’ of the US-China rivalry. Still the media, experts  and ‘Voices in Washington’ continue to promote the competition and the threat of conflict between the US and China. 

Broadly, the dilemma for the two countries appears to be domestic politics in both.    Indeed, both sides appear to tie their foreign policy efforts to domestic concerns. But looking directly at US policy toward China, it seems to me that the greatest problem for its foreign policy today is that it is being driven by US domestic politics and policy  - the  harsh political polarization and the ‘one-upmanship’ between Democrats and Republicans - Hawks versus Progressives. As noted by Brookings colleague,  Ryan Hass in his recent Foreign Affairs article, “America, China, and the virtue of low expectations”: “If the bilateral relationship remains hostage to domestic political  requirements in both countries, there will be a low ceiling for how much progress is possible in forging a more durable relationship.”

In the face of domestically driven foreign policy, it is worth examining the recently released  ‘Independent Task Force Report No. 81’ from the Council on Foreign Relations, titled: “US-Taiwan relations in a new era: Responding to a more assertive China”.

The Report begins with a declaration generally of the current state of the global order and by implication the condition of US-China relations : “The post−Cold War era has drawn to a close, replaced by an era of great power competition and potentially great power conflict, with Taiwan being the most probable flashpoint.  … The Task Force thus believes that although a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait is by no means inevitable, the United States and China are drifting toward a war over Taiwan.”[9]

Though both the United States and Taiwan - and of course China,  continue to express support for the ‘One China Policy’, the policy has evolved nonetheless, leaving one ‘dissenter’ - see just below for the meaning of dissenter -  to acknowledge this and arguing the consequences of such erosion: “In this regard, the report recommends that Washington “maintain its One China policy,” but without meaningfully confronting widespread concerns about the erosion of the substance and credibility of that policy. That erosion, however, is one of the main drivers of cross-strait tensions.”[95]

There were 17 task force members for this Independent CFR Report. The Report was chaired by Susan M. Gordon and Michael Mullen and with David Saks as project director. All the task force members were asked “… to join a consensus signifying that they endorse the general policy thrust, and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.” What is rather striking, quite striking, however, was that seven of the seventeen provided additional and dissenting views. Above one dissenter’s addition. 

Another dissenter expresses a view, repeated by several others that “… the report states as fact that as Xi “approaches the end of his tenure,” the basis of his legitimacy will “shift from delivering economic growth to satisfying Chinese nationalism, and thus increase the probability of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.” But what is the factual basis of this as this dissenter and others argue?” [p.98] 

More generally those dissenting in part from the Report recommendations suggest concern over the weaponization of US-China relations as expressed here by one dissenter: “I write separately first to express discomfort with the report’s dominant military thrust and assessment of a new baseline for strategic ambiguity.” As another concluded: “Firstly, this report, for all its merits, understates the point that deterrence is composed not only of measures that convince the PRC that military action to subjugate Taiwan would come at too high a cost and with a significant risk of failure, but also of measures that convince the PRC that such action is not needed for the time being. Actions and signals by Washington that Beijing interprets as confirmation that the United States remains prepared to accept unification, so long as it is peaceful and on terms agreed upon by China and Taiwan—a position at the heart of the U.S. One China policy—helps to mitigate fear that the “window” for unification is closing and therefore to diminish the sense of urgency that fosters risk-taking.”

The Biden Administration diplomatic approach to US-China may have been most clearly described recently by the earlier mentioned Ryan Hass. Again in his FA article: “Rather than stirring unreasonable hopes of a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, then, the modest framing of the Blinken trip could offer an effective template for dealing with Beijing in the months to come. For the Biden administration, keeping expectations low—even as it works to reduce risk of conflict and search for a shared agenda with China—will be crucial in breaking the downward trajectory of relations between Washington and Beijing.” 

So, I would presume that we will look for similar results from the Yellen visit and others that are likely to follow. Though the volume of US-China encounters will hopefully grow,  the announcements will be modest. Cumulatively, however, a better management of relations will open up notwithstanding the ‘hot’ voices from both capitals.