Source(s) of the Growing Disorder in International Relations

As the weekend approaches, a short contemplation of the growing disorder in international relations

It was hard to ignore the real sense of dread that accompanied any observer gazing at international relations in the last few weeks.  All seem to recognize a growing disorder in international relations. Clearly, the outbreak of war, again, in the Middle East with the Hamas-Israel war has dramatically raised disorder in the region and has even raised the prospect of a wider war. And, of course, this only adds to the disorder raised by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. It is all too noticeable the fragmenting of opinion over these wars and the heightened divisions with China and Russia on one side and a strong element of the Global South unwilling to condemn Russia for its actions in Ukraine and the US and much of Europe and others from the Global South condemning Russia and defending Israel’s right to defend itself against the terrorism of Hamas. 

What explains this? Well,not surprisingly there is no consensus. But I followed a recent discussion raised by my colleague, Dan Drezner who in turn reflected on several articles by New York Times columnist, economist and academic, Paul Krugman. As Dan noted, this most recent Krugman article focused on the growing disorder and international relations explanations: 

Krugman’s primary concern is about the fraying of the liberal international order. And it’s a justified concern — there’s an awful lot of fraying going on!¹ But I am not sure I agree with Krugman’s explanation for why this is happening.

As it turns out, I think, Dan didn’t so much disagree with the basic Krugman thesis as much as he had additional explanations that he felt assisted in more fully understanding what has given rise to the growing disorder. As Krugman sees it, according to Dan, it is domestic politics, particularly American domestic politics, particularly Republican politics that is at the heart of this rising disorder. As Dan describes it:

Then, earlier this week, he speculated further in his New York Times column about why the Pax Americana seems to be over. He rejects the argument that it must be due to the relative decline in U.S. power; the U.S. share of global economic output has remained relatively constant since 1980. He also rejects the claim that the U.S. has been gun-shy about exercising its power by correctly referencing Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman’s recent work on weaponized interdependence.

So what is the cause? Krugman argues that the fault lies with domestic dysfunction — specifically, the Republican Party.

But Dan suggests the explanation provided by Krugman is incomplete. Yes, Dan sees political dysfunction as one aspect of the growing disorder. And, such political dysfunction is not just recent Republican dissembling in the House of Representatives but it can be seen as arising with the Trump presidency and international policies. Just one example -  walking away from the US-Iran deal - is just one dreadful instance of Trump foreign policy. With that, I certainly agree. 

But as Dan suggests: 

But GOP malevolence and incompetence is an incomplete explanation for what is going on here. And Krugman’s skepticism of the benefits of the commercial peace hints at part of the problem.

While US decline in power per se is not seen as a driver, Dan does point to a significant decline: 

First, U.S. allies in Europe and the Pacific Rim do not hold nearly the same share they used to. So if one thinks of “the West” as a single grouping, it has declined.

And there is no question that China’s share of global heft has risen significantly creating what may be described as a ‘faltering unipolarity’. Does this power redistribution explain the growing disorder, it does not seem to me to be a strong enough explanation?

So besides US domestic politics dysfunction what else can we point to. Well, Dan is again helpful here: 

One reason the liberal international order is fraying is that the member countries most loosely tied to it do not see much upside to cooperating with the United States. The implicit contract of the United States maintaining an open economy has come to an end due to unilateral U.S. actions. And those actions have had bipartisan support. … the commercial peace is not an ironclad constraint but it is an important constraint on war in the international system. 

I would also suggest that Republicans, the Biden team, like Krugman et al have weighted the dangers of weaponized interdependence too highly and the benefits of commercial interdependence too lightly.

Thus, ‘Bidenomics’ with the rise in US protectionism and the reshoring of manufacturing, among other things, are yet other elements in the  fraying of the global order. The economic glue provided by an open and deepening economic interdependence is fading. And that has consequences. 

As I have argued before: it is less about the ‘power’ than the ‘politics’; it is less about the ‘structures’ than about the international ‘policies’ that drive order and disorder; that enhance cooperative impulses and dampen conflictual ones.