'National Security Strategy' - and yet for Whom
With the weekend almost upon us, an effort to gather views of the Trump NSS. It is not easy and indeed a bit over long but I hope you enjoy.
There has been a lot of scrutiny and discussion over the recently released Trump National Security Strategy (NSS). There is general acknowledgement that as WPR describes it:
“Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS), published last week, is a clear break from previous iterations of the NSS and outlines a new type of U.S. foreign policy. Gone is the idea of a post-Cold War liberal international order underpinned and led by the United States. The most fundamental break outlined in the strategy, however, is in America’s relationship with Europe. The document functions like a bomb thrown into the middle of the trans-Atlantic relationship and set off alarm bells in European capitals, Ulrike Franke writes in her bi-weekly column.”
What is the NSS? Well, as the historian from Catholic University, Michael Kimmage describes the document recently in FA in a piece titled, “Trump’s Power Paradox: What Kind of World Order Does His National Security Strategy Seek?:
“National security strategy documents of this kind are not blueprints. American presidents end up reacting to crises more than dictating outcome. … No doubt Trump’s second term will be defined more by unpredicted future crises than by any paragraph, sentence, or phrase from the 2025 NSS. That is the story of every American presidency.”
Still many experts, and more, will look to the document for an assessment of Trump foreign policy. As noted by The Economist:
“Despite that, the new NSS matters. Released, weirdly, in the dead of night on December 4th/5th, it will be pored over by soldiers, diplomats and advisers in America and around the world. It is the latest and fullest statement of what “America First” means in foreign policy. It sets the terms for a soon-expected review of military power, and lays out the priorities for all those trying to interpret the president’s wishes. And, for many of its readers, it will be profoundly alarming.”
Yet in the end, while the document apparently sets out an administration strategy and policy direction, don’t presume that it is one that is likely to be followed, especially with this very inconsistent president. Again from WPR, but from December 11th:
“Last Thursday, the Trump administration quietly released its new National Security Strategy. The significance of the document is belied by its stealthy release: It marks a dramatic departure from decades of U.S. foreign policy. Of course, Trump’s actions are essentially guided by whatever he thinks, and what he thinks can swing wildly from one day to another. But to the extent that the NSS document articulates a coherent foreign policy vision, it is something of an America First primer. As such, it offers what could become a guidebook for a post-Trump MAGA foreign policy for those seeking to extend Trumpism beyond this presidency, … “
And, I think it is reasonable to presume that for Trump this is especially the case. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how those around Trump, and to a degree possibly, how Trump himself are thinking about American foreign policy. It will likely set initial expectations over Trump administration actions.
Rather startling the NSS document dismisses the current accepted geopolitical competition view. As pointed out in a Brookings Commentary, titled, “Breaking down Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy”, with a wide variety of researchers:
“The current Trump administration’s new national security strategy departs from the explicit focus on major power competition shared by its two predecessors. The first Trump and Biden administrations both framed China and Russia’s desire to “shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests” as a leading foreign policy concern. China was a long-term “pacing challenge” in the competition for global influence, while Russia was an “acute threat” actively engaged in “subversion and aggression.””
Not this NSS. In contrast to the great power competition of the recent past, the framing of this NSS is:
“By contrast, the new NSS does not expressly reference major power competition once. And it adopts a notably more conciliatory tone toward competitors, framing the challenge as “managing European relations with Russia” and working to “rebalance America’s economic relationship with China.””
But as noted by several experts, the alteration in this NSS focus is noteworthy. As described by C. Raja Mohan in his article in FP:
“Whether the document is a reliable guide to U.S. President Donald Trump’s future actions is unclear. But it is undeniably an important about the United States’ relationship with the world—one that captures the worldview of the MAGA movement and reflects the changing American mood.” …
“The NSS wants to pivot away from the expansive ambitions of U.S. primacy and toward a narrower definition of national interest that is rooted in domestic renewal. For those foreign capitals that have long been resentful of Washington’s sermonizing, this shift marks a welcome ideological recalibration.”
And Richard Haass, the President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), also views examination of the Trump NSS as useful:
“The Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy envisions a world in which the United States no longer anchors alliances and international institutions, stands up for democracy and human rights, or seeks to uphold the global balance of power. Russia and China will find much opportunity in this new world.”
“National security strategies, released from time to time by every US administration, often say little and are quickly forgotten. The latest one, however, issued by the Trump administration late last week, is the exception. It is must reading, for it previews the biggest redirection of US foreign policy since the dawn of the Cold War 80 years ago.”
“What leaps out is the prioritization of economic and commercial interests. The document speaks of reducing America’s trade imbalances, increasing commerce, securing supply chains, and reindustrializing the country. Allies are considered allies only so long as they assume a much larger share of the defense burden. Geoeconomics has superseded geopolitics. Investment is in; assistance is out. Fossil fuels and nuclear power are in; wind, solar, and other renewables are out – along with climate change concerns.”
What else is noteworthy? There are two really dramatic themes contained in this NSS. First, there is the focus on the Western Hemisphere. And then there is the focus on the European allies of the United States.
When it comes to the Western Hemisphere here is Richard Haass again:
“The biggest change is that the Western Hemisphere, long largely ignored, is now at the center of America’s national-security policy. It comes first in the list of what the United States wants in and from the world; it is discussed at length before every other region.”
“The newfound priority can best be understood as stemming from heightened concern over homeland security, an extension of domestic efforts to thwart drug trafficking and stop illegal immigration.”
And Michael Kimmage reacts as well:
“It is bizarre, then, that the Western Hemisphere enjoys pride of place in the strategy document. The implication is that illegal immigration and drug trafficking from Latin America are the preeminent national security challenges for the United States. Severe as these problems are, they pale beside the potential for major destabilization in Europe or the Indo-Pacific.”
Still reality suggests the administration may not have strong relations with many in the Western Hemisphere; take note of Amelia Lester’s thought in the FP:
“However, the postponing of the 10th Summit of the Americas, which the Dominican Republic was set to host this month, has become “emblematic of just how fraught U.S. relations with the region are,” Adam Ratzlaff and Diana Roy write.”
While that may be true, it is interesting to see Tom Wright’s conclusions with regard to the Western Hemisphere. Tom is a good colleague and is a senior fellow with the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Brookings Institution. Tom most recently served as special assistant to the president and senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council in the Biden administration. As Tom states in his most recent piece in The Atlantic:
“The biggest change is that the Western Hemisphere, long largely ignored, is now at the center of America’s national-security policy. It comes first in the list of what the United States wants in and from the world; it is discussed at length before every other region.”
And then there are the views expressed by the Trump administration in the NSS on Europe. Here is Jason Horowitz, the Madrid bureau chief of The New York Times, who writes there:
“The Trump administration issued a national security strategy paper this week that called for European nations to take “primary responsibility” for their own defense, indicating that the United States should no longer guarantee Europe’s security. It accused the European Union of stifling “political liberty,” warned that some NATO members risked becoming “majority non-European,” and said the U.S. should align with “patriotic European parties” — code for Europe’s far-right movements.”
“But the lack of strong public outcry from Europe’s leaders about the strategy document indicated that they had gotten used to Mr. Trump’s tantrums — it was, Mr. Prodi said, “Nothing new: dividing Europe and despising Europe” — and had decided the best response was to let him cry it out and then hold him and the alliance close.”
And Emily Harding writing at CSIS says this about the NSS on Europe:
“The administration is asking—demanding, really—that Europe polices its own part of the world and, most importantly, pays for it itself. The most worrying parts of the strategy are the ones that chastise Europe for losing its European character. The sentiment behind the words seems to stoke fear of migrants and an adherence to an idealized, old-world Europe that is questionable at best. Modern Europe is vibrant, evolving, and—largely—pretty happy. The majority of Europe’s reaction to this NSS is likely to be the same aghast shock as met Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech.”
And then there is this reaction from Mark Leonard, the Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Writing in The Economist he says this:
“The Trump administration’s recently published National Security Strategy accuses mainstream European governments of inviting “civilisational erasure” and “subversion of democratic processes”. It signals its determination to “cultivate resistance” in Europe by working with maga’s fellow travellers across the continent, from Reform uk to the Alternative for Germany (AFD).”
“The Europe section highlights the incoherence of the grand plan. On the one hand, the administration seeks a world of sovereign states and promises to accept other countries for what they are; on the other, with regard to Europe, it advocates regime change and the destruction of the EU, a body that European citizens largely support.”
Finally, a last thought on the NSS, this from two experts from the IPS, Christos Katsioulis and Filip Milačić. They write:
“Fundamentally, it [the NSS] revolves around preserving and expanding the greatness of the US. Simply put, America First. This ranges from a tough anti-immigration policy with enforced border protection to the expansion of the US military, to international relations geared towards American prosperity.”
“In terms of security policy, this strategy marks a shift away from a world order based on common rules. Instead, it posits that stronger nations have more influence. For the US to continue to have the strongest influence in this logic, its allies, and above all Europe, must contribute to this.”
Well, there is much to consider in the document and indeed it may tell us at least what those around Trump would desire, if they could, and more it may even reflect Trump’s broad foreign policy vista or at least broadly the ‘America First’ approach.
Still, it doesn’t tell us anything about Trump’s foreign policy actions today, or indeed tomorrow. Pity.
Image Credit: Homeland Security Today