Economic Security Challenges for Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD) and Action
A first look at various China-West Dialogue (CWD) sessions on MPD this week and next. For your reading pleasure late in this weekend, or, for your Monday morning reading.
I was contemplating this weekend, and will continue to do so in the coming week, I hope, the presence and influence of ‘Middle Powers’ in current global order relations. My thinking on the subject was raised first by a China-West Dialogue (CWD) gathering this past Friday, April 26th. This virtual gathering focused on aspects of Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD). The session was led by colleague Matthew Ferchen who is currently a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. Matt provided a paper, titled, “Rethinking Resilience and Interdependence: Alternative Asian Approaches to Economic Security and Mitigating US-China Rivalry”. Though this paper is currently just in draft form, the CWD session enabled Matt to present the major themes and receive feedback from a number of discussants and others present at the session. As Matt suggested:
This paper is part of a new project to find a better balance in the economics-security nexus in Asia and beyond. The focus in this initial piece is on how four countries in Asia - Australia, Japan, S. Korea, and Taiwan, are approaching policies related to economic security and resilience. The hope is that this links up with some of the discussions we've been having on how Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD) can mitigate the US-China rivalry and tensions.
But the examination of MPD was also on my mind because of the coming week. CWD in fact is joining with the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) and America China Public Affairs Institute (ACPAI) in Washington on Wednesday in a half day session focusing on, as CCG suggested: “Advancing global governance and human security for a better future”. The second of the two Wednesday sessions in Washington is being led by CWD Co-Chair Colin Bradford with the goal of: “Moving forward global governance in a new global dynamic of pluralism: Prospects and challenges for middle power diplomacy”. As a headnote for this gathering Colin remarks that the session could reflect the following:
2024 could be a year of opportunity for advancing global governance by capitalizing on latent, underlying global political dynamics to shift great power relations with the rest of the world and tee up a new era in which global governance can advance even as systemic competition continues between the US, China and Europe. Middle Powers exist today with agency and influence to play a role in addressing global threats. Understanding Middle Power Diplomacy and its implications for the global order can generate transformative forces in fostering multilateral consensus on global governance. The Brazilian and South African G20 presidencies during 2024 and 2025, with the US to follow in 2026, could become pivotal focal points for transition to a new era in global relations in which MPD demonstrates the feasibility of advancing humanity’s quest for peace, security, equality, and sustainable development. This session aims for a broad engagement of diverse perspectives, cutting across disciplines, sectors and regions.
Colin then suggests the following as setting up the discussion:
Framing questions:
1. What is Middle Power Diplomacy and how the concept can factor in independent and cross-national policy space to address global governance challenges?
2. Following the Bali Declaration in November 2022 and the pause in US-China tensions after the Biden-Xi summit in November 2023 in San Francisco, what are the prospects for MPD to play an active role in global governance leadership?
3. What are specific issues on which greater potential for convergence and cooperation exist in a global governance dimension, not a geopolitical context for MPD to bridge divides and invigorate coordinated efforts between countries?
So a lot of thinking, in other words, about the role of Middle Powers in the continuing context of great power rivalry and tension especially between China and the US and geopolitical tensions generated by current Russian aggression against Ukraine in Europe and the Gaza war in the Middle East.
Colin in an accompanying draft article for Washington titled, “Toward a new era in global relations: The potential of Middle Power diplomacy to shift global political dynamics”, prepared for the Global Solutions Initiative (GSI), and the annual Summit for GSI in the week after the Washington meeting in Berlin, focuses on the possibilities for advancing global governance through Middle Power leadership at the G20:
The Brazil and South Africa G20 presidencies during 2024 and 2025 provide opportunities for them to capitalize on the “pause” in toxic tense geopolitical relations between China and the US during 2024 and to strengthen the roles of middle power diplomacy in global governance.
There are now 17 middle powers in the G20 that are capable of assuming leadership on different segments of the global agenda and working with others to generate agreements on specific issues and convergence where there has been division. There are two categories of countries that qualify as Middle Powers (MP). One is those Advanced Industrial Countries (AIC MPs) from the West, each of whom has regional and global influence in global affairs. The second category consists of Emerging Middle Powers (EMPs) which are rising powers largely from the non-western world.
Matt in his examination has focused on economic security issues and showing how the four Asian Middle Powers - Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, have to varying degrees sought to carve out space to maintain economic and political relations with both the US and with China:
Not only do all four countries compared here continue to see value in some major form of regional integration but they also value rules-based institutions and multilateral venues for dispute resolution and debate. One of the most difficult challenges facing any form of cooperation in the name of economic security and resilience is finding the balance between security-minded restrictive measures (e.g., export controls and investment screening) and the raft of new industrial policy measures many countries are pursuing in the name of economic prosperity and competitiveness. It’s not at all apparent how far cooperation can go on either, but it seems clear that a venue for new and honest discussions about the legitimate role of states to pursue either security-minded restrictions or more growth and competitive-minded policies (including subsidies or infant-industry protections) is needed.
Both sessions in fact explore the continuing efforts by Middle Powers to expand and further extend economic relations, notwithstanding the US-China competition and rivalry and the rising geopolitical tensions. I am looking to draw some general conclusions and outcomes about the impact and possibilities of MPD after the CWD sessions in Washington. Hopefully, I can return to MPD following the Washington gathering.