Catching up first with - South Africa

So I'm progressing on a series of catch ups - starting with the elections in South Africa

We are following several developing stories with impacts for international relations and also consequences for: global governance projects and the prospects for reform and revitalization of multilateralism. 

Let me start with South Africa though let’s not forget that there are other meaningful elections going on: in Mexico and the conclusion after 6 weeks of the Indian national elections. 

But let’s focus for this post on South Africa. As I pointed out to readers and listeners earlier this weekend, I was lucky enough to sit down in the Virtual Studio for a ‘Summit Dialogue’ Podcast (S 2, Ep 5 - “An Interview with Elizabeth Sidiropoulos on the Future of South Africa and its Leadership of the G20, the BRICS+ and More”) with Elizabeth Sidiropoulos. Elizabeth is the Chief Executive of South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and among other things we talked about South Africa’s future directions following the South African election. 

This election, as we have now found out, has produced a real  ‘bombshell’ of a result.  The ANC that has dominated South African politics since the end of apartheid has suffered a major defeat. As described by David Pilling and his colleague in the FT: 

Though the election result has not been formally declared, with all votes counted the ANC had won just 40.2 per cent, a result that one senior party member said had sent “shockwaves” through the organisation.

The centrist Democratic Alliance came in second with 22 per cent. But the big winner was the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party launched six months ago by former president Jacob Zuma, which surged to 14.6 per cent of the vote.

The dramatic results have called into question the continuing leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa. Again, from David Pilling:

Zuma, who was declared ineligible to stand for parliament due to a previous criminal conviction for contempt of court, has said MK would be willing to form a coalition with the ANC, but only if it were to ditch Ramaphosa, with whom he has a personal vendetta. … The ANC, whose top decision-making body, the National Executive Committee, will meet on Tuesday to conduct an autopsy of its poor performance and discuss coalition options, was resolute this would not happen. … Analysts say Ramaphosa is under intense pressure after his party suffered a worse than expected 17 percentage point fall, from the 57.5 percent achieved in the 2019 election. This represented “a seismic shift in politics”, said law professor Richard Calland.

Assessing the electoral outcome the Editorial Board of the FT  described the results this way: 

The ANC lost 17 percentage points from 2019. Nearly 15 of these went to Zuma’s MK party, whose appeal went beyond its core Zulu constituency. The free-market DA party barely budged from last time at 22 per cent while the radical Economic Freedom Fighters of Julius Malema fell to 9.5 per cent. Viewed another way, the ANC won 65 per cent; its problem is that it has split into three factions: Zuma’s party, Malema’s party and the governing party led by Cyril Ramaphosa.

Leaving aside for the moment the status of the current ANC President, it would appear that there are two more likely than not coalition prospects given the dramatic fall in percentage outcomes for the ANC. You might well imagine and see a more ‘moderate coalition’: that would be the coalition of the ANC and the Democratic Alliance. The DA might be the major part of a unity coalition or it might have the ANC governing as a minority but  with the support of the DA. Though this would be hard for more radical folk in the ANC - given that the DA is a strong supporter of market-oriented reforms as opposed to a state-led economic governance model and the DA has long been viewed as a ‘white’ Party, it could well represent a stable and potentially moderate governing coalition. The alternative of course would be a more radical coalition: the ANC, the MK, led by Jacob Zuma the disgraced former ANC President and possibly even including the radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EEF) led by  Julius Malema.  If it were the latter it could well be a governing coalition prepared to dramatically increase nationalizations and accelerate land expropriation likely without compensation. The crowning of this more radical coalition would likely have a dramatic impact on the South African economy leading to foreign investors fleeing and the real prospect of a currently barely growing economy with very high unemployment, especially youth unemployment, dramatically contracting.

One immediate impact  would be the stability or instability of the governing party. This could well diminish South Africa’s attention to the upcoming Brazil G20 and then on the South Africa G20. Even more dramatically if the radical coalition takers hold we might well see  an ideologically more radical governing coalition pushing the envelope and turning South Africa’s time in the presidency of G20, at least far more rhetorically extreme - and to the detriment of the G20 South Africa year. 

Following the course of government creation and policy creation in South Africa may be a necessary and a worrying prospect for the Informals.